Tag Archives: psychoanalysis

Fishing for narratives

 

There’s a fair amount of gender stuff in this blog recently. That’s because there’s a lot of gender stuff in my forthcoming book, Getting Real About Sex Addiction. Inevitable, I think, when the dominant context in the field of treatment is heteronormative—meaning, aimed at heterosexual men. It gets tiresome reiterating this, given the zeitgeist demand for diversity. Even barely interested publishers want to know if mine and Joe Farley’s efforts would attend to the needs of sexual minorities. But sex addiction (SA) treatment’s dominant attention to the “needs” of heterosexual men is a fact in this country—one of not many facts, actually, in the field of SA treatment, but a fact nonetheless.

The demographics of treatment, plus the typical split-formats of group therapy in particular, enables a predictable positioning of men and women. These positions are girded by chestnut beliefs that permeate society, dominate pop psychology literature (at least), and thus infiltrate the offices of psychotherapists. I sometimes think that all one needs to be a therapist in the present dystopia is to have a sociology degree from university coupled with an accurate take upon what social and political beliefs reign in the community in which one practices. Thereafter, treatment models and theory is what you have to filter those beliefs, employing jargon so as to affirm whatever narrative is most palatable. Facts? Yes, there are facts, plenty of which are relevant to treatment, and depending upon the context, they may determine whether society invests money in mental health care. But make no mistake: in the absence of research that actually proves that one method, intervention, or “style” is most effective over time, our field of practice, following the dictates of consumerism, will pursue that which is quickest and cheapest, and with respect to gender issues—those narratives that are most familiar.

So, do I have specific examples of treatment-distorting narratives? Indeed I do. Take, for example, the commonly expressed view that the sex addiction construct “excuses” the behavior of afflicted individuals, in effect privileging heterosexual men unfairly. This view fits a prejudice of both progressive society and, in this context, also traditionalist observers, and so the narrative sticks. Only it’s BS. That’s right. I think wordpress allows the contraction. I’ve been treating individuals, couples, men and women who present on both sides of the acting out/non-acting out divide for nearly twenty years, and in my opinion, the opposite of the “excuse” narrative is more prevalent. The SA assessment (it’s still not a diagnostic category in this country) does not yield clemency for someone who cheats on his or her partner. Divorce or separation rates do not diminish because the specter of sex addiction has rendered conflictual couples more flexible in their mores. And as far as illegal activities are concerned, I find that courts and sex offender treatment “protocols” are largely unmoved when individuals claim that a progressive addiction is the cause of an unacceptable behavior. Crossing the line of moral horror is as much a criteria of addiction as frequency of behavior or states of craving, and the horrified—meaning the righteous onlookers—do not excuse.

Nor should they, I think, by which I simply mean that self-identified addicts shouldn’t be exempted from legal consequences that result from behaviors known to be illegal. The addict made a choice, I say, disagreeing with what some recovering addicts think. Nor do I think that impacted partners are obliged to forgive their addicted partners, especially if “forgiving” entails remaining in a relationship with a habitually slipping or relapsing addict. Still, the truer reductionism with respect to the term addict is one of scapegoating. Addiction, a concept borne as much via ontology as medical science, is often blamed for a crossection of habits that straddle behavioral, psychological, even spiritual manifestations. This is largely the influence of the 12-step community, which seeks to support individuals afflicted with what it thinks is a disease, though in personifying the problem of addiction (“my addict is telling me…”), it enables shorthand explanations that circumvent complexity, yielding facile and false narratives. As a result, potentially dynamic problems between couples are cast as the unilateral fault of “the addict”: “Typical addict. I ask him to pick up the kids after soccer practice, and of course he forgets…”

Therein lies a bridge to gender issues, which are also subject to reductionism and stereotype. Combined with the prejudices aimed at male sexuality, broader assumptions about male versus female traits deliver a hammer blow to heterosexual men in sex addiction treatment. In drawing attention to the circular logic that pervades my field, I wrote in Getting Real about the assumptions of masculine privilege that underlay interventions and imagined what eating disorder treatment might be like if corresponding biases prevailed in that context. Are women privileged in representing the majority of admissions to eating disorder treatment? Do men, by implication, find it more difficult, more stigmatizing, to admit problems related to losing or gaining weight, and does the construct of “eating disorder” shield or excuse women (mostly) from moral judgements that might otherwise be aimed at them: the imputation of greed, for example. Well, excessive eating (or the reverse, self-starvation) does induce moral judgements, but not as much as sex does, and feminists and traditionalists ally in the belief that pornography and prostitution are immoral entities, either because they promote exploitation or promiscuity.

More skewed narratives, I write in Getting Real. I don’t dispute the progressive premise, which observes exploitation of women’s sexuality, ignoring promiscuity unless there are power differentials, like someone paying or being in charge—plus someone getting paid, behaving subserviently. Unlike social conservatives, progressives object to power differentials that they deem institutionalized, though like conservatives, they are selective as to what they think exploitative, and like conservatives, they appear to sanctify sex more than any other human behavior. Ostensibly, the exploitation of violence is likewise objectionable, but close inspection suggests not. For example, in response to January’s SuperBowl event, I’ve heard numerous women—menu feminists, I call them—complain that the game’s vaunted halftime show, featuring scantily-clad Jennifer Lopez and Shakira, was yet another example of patriarchal culture objectifying women (it didn’t seem to matter that the female performers in question clearly chose their roles and likely earned a lot of money). None of these women remarked on the main event, which featured similarly well-paid gladiators, many of whom will be crippled if not brain-damaged by middle age, all for the entertainment of our Pax Romana—sorry, American—dream. They chose their roles as well, of course. Or, does anyone really choose, I hear some asking?

The professions of fisherman, electricians, roofers, and landscapers have two things in common. Firstly, they are all male-dominated professions. This fact alone would reinforce for many a belief that masculine privilege reigns in our present-day society: the term “male dominance” linked psychically with male advantage. Fact number two might muddy the waters of what is known versus what is presumed. Those same four professions are above firefighters, policemen, and apparently military personnel in a Bureau of Labor report indicating the most dangerous jobs in the United States, based upon an aggregate of workplace injuries and time off work. How privileged am I as a psychotherapist to not worry about electrocuting myself, or slipping off a roof or a high tree, or—I guess—a fishing boat? Who knew: that’s the most dangerous job of all, apparently. The French analyst Jacques Lacan wrote that mental processes issue from an intertwining—what he termed a Borromean knot—comprised of three realms: the imaginary, the symbolic, and the real. The imaginary contains proto-concepts born of imagery, our intrinsic narcissism; our earliest split-recognitions of self and other. The symbolic represents such representations via language, via laws and social structures—the unconscious organization of society. The realm of the “real” exists beyond what is known—beyond the not-quite language that brings us “addiction”, and reality-approximating words like “standards”, “protocols”—to the imperceptible. The blockage of the real exists in our repetitions, which represent our beating-our-heads-against attempts to contrive. Lacan called this our automaton behavior. The imperative of moral equivalence (a lingua favorite of progressives, I notice) gets employed to reduce discussion, cast opinion as fact, to dismiss narratives that don’t fit with an orthodox message.

Alright then, let’s compare an iconic women’s movement moment with an unrecognized as such yet contemporaneous watershed in the cause of men: the burning of the bra was about sexual and economic freedom, the former proceeding from the latter. The burning of the draft card was about not dying at the behest of authority.

We get that it is true, what Lacan taught. We get it and we don’t.

 

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On Circularity and Tautology

 

Just before Covid broke out and thereafter shut us in, I’d started going to Peets to prepare notes for this blog. I’d already had in mind to write a few overdue thoughts on the matter of tautology when I saw an anecdotal cue in the corner of my eye. Over the shoulder of a diligent girl with a winning, sympathetic smile who served me coffee was a poster proclaiming that the house brew from Colombia was a hundred percent grown by women—that is, men were not involved, presumably. For a fleeting, half-witted moment I wondered why this was necessary to advertise before thoughts of obligation intruded. Was there a tradition of female exclusion in the Colombian coffee industry? I wondered. Amid the progressively flavored ambience the question seemed foolish, and not because I ought to have known something, anything, about Colombian culture. The poster’s claim/boast will have been deemed acceptable by marketers; been green-lighted by franchise execs, nodded to by employees and duly patronized by a genteel, civic-minded customer base. Why? Because its premise will have been deemed unfalsifiable. No evidence necessary. Circular reasoning, in philosophical and critical thinking circles—not so much the office spaces of advertisers, I’ll venture. Was research into the history of the Colombian coffee trade really necessary? That women had been hitherto excluded was a given, wasn’t it? Would it even matter if the implication wasn’t true?
Unfalsifiable ideas (ideas immune to rebuke) designed for professional and thereafter public consumption are nothing new in modern psychology. An acknowledgement of this dates back to the 1930s at least, when Freud wrote in “Constructions in Analysis” that psychoanalysis employs circular reasoning when considering the accuracy of interpretations. If a patient were to reject an interpretation, it is only a sign of resistance, many analysts thought. Those of the Kleinian school took it a step further, suggesting that a resistant, interpretation-rebuffing patient was one exhibiting a “negative therapeutic reaction”: meaning, an act of aggression, denying the nurturing goodness of the attending analyst. Even those who write with tongue-in-cheek satire of this stance confess guilt when asked if they have ever resisted the resistance of a patient—even claiming that the correctness of an insight was or is confirmed by the denial of the patient. Indeed, the more intense the denial, the more deeply embedded is the truism, was or is often the belief. The matter of real interest becomes the correspondence between the intensity of denial and the level of unconsciousness: the deeper the idea is buried, the more intense the denial of the analyst’s interpretation.

Circular thinking is habitual; that is, it happens unconsciously and repeatedly, so they lodge in the mind. I recall one example from an academic setting, during a somewhat delicate discussion about touch in therapy, as in the prospect or practice of physical touching between clinicians and patients. The sensitivity in the air concerned the matter of sexuality, of course, and more specifically, the legacy of sexual abuse by male practitioners upon female patients. Amid this background, however, the view remains that some manner or degree of touch between patient and provider may be appropriate. Hugging, for example, or shaking hands. Fair enough? Not so fast, complained one student—a woman—who pointed out that most of the literature on the subject of touch between patient and analysts/therapists has been written by men. She needn’t have substantiated her point, it seemed. Still, what she then pointed out, without comment on the contradiction, was that an analyst named Judith Butler has “written more on the subject of touch in the clinical setting than anyone”.
????
As in more than anyone since men stopped writing on the subject, assuming that’s still allowed? The data point supplied had not perturbed the previously declared premise. My not-quite-as-provocative-as-that query didn’t yield an answer on this occasion. My fellow student didn’t identify the men of yesteryear who had previously dominated the topic. Neither did the instructor. They simply thought it a refreshing change, not an irony, that the most prominent commentator upon touch in therapy was a woman. By the way, I’m sure there has been plenty of “research” into this question, utilizing hidden cameras no doubt, to determine how often, and by what proportions of each gender, that physical touch is occurring in therapists’ offices. I know. I’m not taking this seriously, am I? Well, not quite. It’s more that I don’t take seriously the thinking or methodology that’s being applied to this subject. I can’t be bothered to review beyond what I already have what’s being written on this subject, as if it could be studied objectively. And it hasn’t. I imagine (borderline assume) that the fewer male therapists that remain in this field are as conservative as I am. I shake hands. I will give a hug to a male patient, usually without concern. I will give a hug to a female patient at the end of an intermediate-to-long-term therapy, assuming she initiates. I will never initiate. Never. The day that changes is the day it becomes acceptable to have hidden cameras in my office. And that’s the day I retire, frankly. Actually, that’s bravado. I’d check my bank account first. So, who knows about what’s under the surface, or behind closed doors upon which “In session” still interdict? Should we know?

Circling back to my main topic: circularity. In the crossover realm of addictions and addiction treatment, which I attempt to describe in the forthcoming book, Getting Real About Sex Addiction, there are analogous tautologies, which are redundant expressions indicating unfalsifiable logic. The term “male sex addict” may be one example; the phrase “objectification of women” may be another: terms that may seem redundant because of prejudicial beliefs. Do we assign the term sex addiction to women in an era sensitive to “slut shaming”? Would the term “objectification of men” be deemed a thing by an average observer not prone to ontological (nature of being) insight? There are chestnut beliefs taken for granted by many, professionals as well as consumers of psychotherapy.

One that exists on the periphery of mental health care emanates from Alcoholics Anonymous, still the most prominent sobriety movement in the United States after a near century of existence. Absent a painstaking assessment of a drinking history, and sometimes even in spite of said data collection, a person who presents for help, either within a 12-step milieu or within a 12-step-based treatment program, is often thought to be in denial of a problem simply if he or she denies a problem. The presentation for assessment, for care—whether at the behest of others or not—signifies the conclusion a priori. Hence a circularity: if an individual presenting for care admits that he is an addict/alcoholic, then he is an addict/alcoholic. If he equivocates or else denies that he is an addict/alcoholic, he is still an addict/alcoholic. It’s just that friends, family and professional helpers will all now have some work to do upon the resistant mind.

No surprise that similar phenomena contaminates the sub-field of sex addiction treatment, which is otherwise largely preoccupied with medical, ontological, and phenomenological (study of experience) questions regarding diagnoses and criteria: questions like, what is this thing we call addiction? Or, for those still debating the details, what are the events or behaviors that actually happened? Hence, the field ignores its other assumptions. But tautologies and circular reasoning are apparent, and not just amongst practitioners and patients, but especially amongst the non-acting out, “betrayed” partners of designated sex addicts who, in the aftermath of a discovered acting out pattern, are hypervigilant to clues of wayward behavior, including instances of denials or argumentativeness. I’ve known more than one partner of an addict declare with studied conviction that she knew that her partner had slipped or relapsed in his behavior, not so much because of some undeniable evidence pointing to this conclusion, but rather because the intensity of his denials implied the unconscious defense of negation—negation of that which is necessarily deemed true. So, don’t tell me that analytic ideas have no place in the modern conversation of addictions just because people don’t know the theoretical derivatives of their assumptions. Next, this issue of whether an addict is an addict based upon whether he self-identifies or else because he’s in denial is just the tip of the iceberg on this matter of tautology and sex addiction. As my opening anecdote suggests, the muddying of water (or coffee) extends to gender biases intersecting with notions of what is trauma, or what constitutes objectification as these concepts pertain to an already loaded subject—sex. Okay, I got called out recently (you might have read) for using words like ‘trauma’ without explaining what it means. As if I know what it means! That doesn’t mean that I don’t have ideas, or even experiences that would inform, but I think the term’s meaning has become diluted in our culture. For once, I’ll be brief and orienting, for I think the debate congeals around a triangular phenomenon: firstly, there is the notion that trauma is the crazy-making event. Second and third, the question (broadly) is whether the crazy began in the self or within some un-locateable pre-verbal memory, or further, whether crazy stems from a later (even contemporary) crazy-making event. Platitudinous wisdom suggests that some combination of each phenomena is true.
Thanks
If the subject of trauma across contexts has been contaminated, can you imagine what I think has happened when the context is sex? Well, without the background specter of sex and gender politics, it’s hard to imagine that sex addiction would have gathered steam as a concept, displacing as it has (almost) in recent years the relatively benign if not old-fashioned construct of infidelity.
In Getting Real, I argue that sex addiction treatment is a subsidiary front in a zeitgeist war against male sexuality. The evidence for systemic tautological fallacies lie in the far higher rates of men being admitted to sex addiction treatment versus women, coupled with the absurdist view that such admission rates constitute a privileging of care for men instead of the neo-Scarlet lettering that it obviously is. Now, I know there are some who would reject my appropriation. Cue again the concern with matters of moral equivalence, or asymmetry. So, once again, I accept that the plight of modern sex addicts doesn’t match the experience of ostracized women in 17th century New England, but also (once again), metaphors and allegory don’t imply equivalence or symmetry. They serve as reference points, and are inherently imprecise, as all meaningful things are. Incidentally, few would argue that the trauma of sex addicts’ partners matches that of combat veterans, but does that render the term sex addiction induced trauma invalid? I don’t know if the people who promulgate this hegemonic opinion also believe that sex addiction is an unnecessarily pathologizing label, but it wouldn’t surprise me if such concurrences of semi-thought, which compound absurdity, exist in our professional field. Beyond the statistical surfaces, the ethical complaints that accompany the sex addiction concept—that pornography and prostitution exploits and objectifies, or that extramarital affairs betray partners—largely target a heterosexual male population whilst shielding would-be female sex addicts from a similar excoriation. In my view, a now dominantly female proletariat in mental health care is wary of attaching pathologizing labels to female sexuality, which results in circular, apologist formulations. Therefore, a woman who acts out sexually with pornography or prostitution or serial affairs does not exploit or objectify others, especially men, but rather internalizes a demeaning state of mind such that what she does she invariably does to herself.
Uh-huh. Again, note the Cliff Notes co-opting of a psychoanalytic concept, which is common within frameworks that comprise the sex addiction field. More importantly, note the assertion of ideas across mental health/sociological spectrum that are presented credulously; that is, immune to falsification.

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1160 Just Desserts

 

1160

That’s how many views I have. Or, that’s how many I had the last time I checked so I might have a few more by now. I have seven ‘likes’, I write mock-excitedly. And one thumbs down, I’ll report with a frown.

What does it mean? What does it say of my presentation, “Dr. Strangelove in the 21st century: or how I learned to stopped worrying and love my phone (Or, how I learned to stop worrying and love the virus—it’s alternative title since mid-March, for obvious reasons), that no one has, uh…commented? What do I expect? That people will have an opinion, and express it? Firstly, I quibble, it’s not clear what the number represents. A ‘view’ could mean that someone clicked on the video, intrigued by the subject and heading, and watched the slideshow plus clips and commentary in its entirety. A view could also mean that someone clicked on the video, watched and listened for a few seconds, decided that it was dull and therefore clicked away, perhaps to watch a clip from the film with no commentary instead. What did the viewer expect? Just clips from the film, justifying justifiable tributes–“one of the greatest films ever”, is a typical response–with little interest in the commentary? The title (of my talk) portends a satire that—as the informed viewer might think—parallels the satire of the film. Perhaps that’s a pretentious aim, to suggest parallel, which is a kissing cousin to the notion that my presentation and Stanley Kubrick’s great film belong in the same breath. But again, if that thought represents a sample of reaction, why was it not expressed? The internet population is not exactly well known for holding back. Isn’t it the great bastion of uncensored thought, after all? But perhaps that supposition supposes something else: that viewers will care. To write a comment is to make an effort. And if a viewer is known to me, a comment exposes, risks my displeasure if the first displeasure was theirs.

I could drive myself bat-shit crazy with all of these flitting theories. I haven’t, for I am bat-shit crazy for other reasons, yet this thought segues to the early substance of my talk (or perhaps the lack of substance, as my analyst suggests), which focuses upon the silly names of Dr. Strangelove’s characters. I don’t start with the eponymous ex-Nazi scientist played by Peter Sellers, but instead a minor character named Bat Guano, played by veteran character actor Keenan Wyn. See, I thought it wryly amusing that I didn’t know the meaning of Bat Guano for many years, despite being enamored of the name from the film. I simply thought it a silly-sounding pair of words, which betrays that I will sometimes settle for aesthetics and forsake meaning in my patronage of the arts. Still, I was open enough to meaning to notice the term in a James Bond novel, Dr. No; to make the link with the character from Dr. Strangelove, find it funny that I’d been unknowingly amused by the term for at least two decades, and then say to myself something like, oh right…bat shit crazy!

Internal dialogue. That reminds me of a critique I once received of a novel I wrote ten years ago. It was a comment from someone who cared. Too much internal dialogue, they said, without explaining why this was a problem necessarily. Oh well. Anyway, here’s my critique of my bat-shit aside: perhaps too much time was spent in the early part of my talk musing anecdotally upon funny-sounding words. It’s not as if I am famous and can therefore indulge myself knowing that an audience or readership will “bear with me”. I should have gripped the listener with something more directly substantive about the film, about its relevance to 21st century concerns, as I had promised. Had I prepared this talk about two months later than I had, I might have included a bit about so-called Chinese “wet” markets being, uh, bat shit crazy. I’d like to write that concerns about bad taste intervened, but in truth it was hindsight, the arrival of a late-arriving consciousness that had me saying to myself something like, oh right…I could have said that thing about bat shit crazy. In my video’s box of description, I’d promised more than cute personal anecdotes. The listener would get psychoanalytic commentary, a comic impersonation of two (my deep-voiced impression of toxically masculine Jack Ripper, most notably), a few comic asides, plus a musical ending to—again—parallel the film, its sentimentalized climax.

By the time the dense section of my talk begins, which is about ten minutes into it, I might have already lost most of those 1160 viewers. Is dense the same as substantive, you may wonder? Now that you are a few minutes into this blog entry, and have sort of  demonstrated that you care, I will bother to recap a thought or two. Firstly (deep breath), I review the psychopathy and underlying neurosis of the film’s Ripper character. I offer that he plus a few others may remind us of some who roam the corridors of power today. Secondly, I suggest that we are as concerned with man-made threats to the planet as we were in 1964, though with more emphasis upon slowly-moving climate change than the quick flashes of nuclear annihilation. I remind that we seem as nervous about the Russians as ever (though again, for slightly different reasons), and lastly—and wearingly for some, maybe—that we are as enslaved to technocracy as ever. This is Kubrick’s most indelible message, I suggest: that we’ve left HAL in charge. However, the Ripper material is somewhat esoteric, focusing upon his defensive rants about fluoridation, which have justified his wanton launch of a nuclear attack, and which conceals an underlying sexual inadequacy, which he sort of confesses to his confidant, the amiable Lionel Mandrake. That he is unable to act upon his remorse and accept Mandrake’s path of redemption (“give me the recall code, Jack!) reveals what Kleinian theory describes as a “negative therapeutic reaction”: an important analytic idea denoting that person who has too much hate, too much persecutory anxiety, that they cannot accept the possibilities of redemption, or of reparative love. They can only seek destruction, firstly of persecutors, and then, finally, of themselves. Hence, Ripper commits suicide.

Is that relevant to our world today? Interesting? Worthy of comment? Who knows? It’s too early, maybe, to determine if my thoughts bridge time and place with popular art, adding anything of note. Perhaps scores of those 1160 viewers are taking in what I’ve said and not so much moved on but…see, I can’t finish the sentence. I just don’t know what they think, so I’m left in a field of my own projections, wondering, fantasizing. Indulging? For one thing, this is no more than what I get for privileging Facebook as my vehicle of promotion. Further, no more than scores of patients who sit with people like me, speaking of their neuroses, which often congeal around the mysteries of others’ thoughts: what do other people think? Do they care? Are they dangerous, and where does that leave me in the equation? And what does he think of me, because he won’t tell me. Not really. There are 1160 people who have clicked on to my Dr. Strangelove talk and slideshow. As far as I know, that’s far more than the number of people who have read any of my self-published books. A handful have indicated that they like my talk, but said nothing more. That’s how it is at the end of a talk that was scheduled for a live presentation in May. For that now cancelled event I’d anticipated applause, some of it enthusiastic, some of it merely polite. The technocratic medium robs me of that lovely ambiguity. Now silence and absence is the end of the talk, and of my story.

 

 

 

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What is always there

 

But seriously, the “project” that was once psychoanalysis, or now psychotherapy or whatever, has been disrupted by Covid-19. Telemedicine, Telehealth, Telepresence, is here to stay, according to some. This is a watershed moment, a bump or a shove into the next paradigm. No going back? Well, I won’t be the only one kicking and not quite screaming, but rather only moaning and possibly sulking. I’ve lost one or two from the caseload: people who perhaps think the virus scare is not what it’s negatively cracked up to be. Or—here’s a thought—maybe they think I’m not all I am positively cracked up to be, and therefore the crisis that’s upon us is a pretext for a separation. Neurosis aside, this situation is not what I trained for. Something’s missing, and something else has been mobilized in response. Temporally appropriate feedback. That’s a term I heard yesterday, used to explain why the phone, the latest video technology, the e-mail, and even the text message might be used for a psychotherapeutic exchange and why the fax machine never was. It wasn’t quick enough, basically. That’s what temporally appropriate feedback means, by the way. Yes, I know. Talk about unnecessary verbiage, someone’s dissertation nomenclature. Anyway, whatever’s happened overnight, it seems tailor-made for opportunists, entrepreneurs; futurist thinkers with a survivalist edge and a nose for the front of a line. I’ve thought about my peers, even some of my colleagues in all of this. Some of them belong in the jungle, I think, pulling at the bamboo, or squeezed into a tight gap beneath a fallen hut or an all-terrain jeep. They have grease on their hands, an ample toilet paper stash, and numbers dancing across their mirrored pupils, for they have versatile, fix-it aptitudes, which means they navigate well all the toys that mediate contact with the material world and which are derivatives of the childhood games they played better than anyone else.

What is always there is never noticed until it is missing, said Jose Bleger. That’s another of those psychoanalytic aphorisms that are meant to stir thought if not practical solutions. What is it that was always there? I have wondered aimlessly instead of, say, moving to use Venmo, or signing up for What’s App, or whatever, as if those were the clues. I don’t skip along a trail of newfangled ideas the way that others who…don’t use words like newfangled and therefore don’t have issues with planned obsolescence, come to think of it. I thought I had an idea, dull as it may seem, of what was and is always there: the analytic frame, manifest as the office space, with a door leading to a waiting area wherein a would-be patient sits and waits for me to open my door and beckon them towards me. It sounds more authoritarian than it is. And it seemed like it still had a few years left in it, too, as paradigmatic frameworks go. Now it isn’t there. Or, it is there but it seems like an abandoned warehouse with a faintly stale air about it. Recently, I’ve not been getting my money’s worth out of my office. It collects mail, a bit more dust than usual. I can go there once a week and make a phone call from it if I like, but it’s not the same. The nice view from the window’s not the same. There’s no collegial hum across the walls that connect to other suites. There’s nothing charming anymore about the rickety elevator that takes me to my floor, or pleasing about the sudden abundance of parking spaces in the adjoining lot. And after the first week of lockdown—not even the consolation of a few toilet rolls to steal from the bathrooms. What was always there? I haven’t figured that out yet, but like a good would-be analyst, I am thinking, still wondering.

Meanwhile, I am thinking of bigger things, philosophical, mindful ideas. Phenomenology, I think. I’m reminiscing, at least, if not deepening. Back in 2001, I thought 9-11 was a fine how-do-you-do to the 21st century. Now I think that episode less an introduction to doomsday than the residue of the last century, with all of its terrorizing, authoritarian ghosts. Not that we don’t have plenty of nutjobs these days, but you don’t beat the 20th century for tyrants and martial horror: two world wars, a couple of nuclear explosions (not counting the tests in the Pacific and the deserts of the American Southwest); Hitler, Stalin, a few other genocides, assassinations all over the place, at least one war that America lost. Seriously, a total s—tshow. But 9-ll, which made household names of Al Queda and a guy named Bin Laden, seems today like a distant memory of airport inconvenience and yesteryear jingoism: a tough deal for anyone sniffing at a military life, but for the rest of us, not the economic and civil collapse that stares at us now. Images of twin towers burning didn’t make the cut of my recent Dr. Strangelove video, with its “We’ll Meet Again” montage of zeitgeist existential threats, 2020-style. Not topical. Scenes of floods, wildfires, stranded polar bears and penguins on thinning ice were the visual accompaniment, not the cold war terror of mushroom clouds or the once Arab stereotype of airplane hijackings. Covid-19 snuck into the slide show with the odd picture of a solitary figure wearing a hospital mask amid empty landscapes, signifying for me, anyway, the ubiquity of the virus’ impact: the live presentation I was meant to give on Strangelove was canceled, after all.

The ‘live’ has always been there. Nature has always been there, and the notion that it won’t be has long felt like an abstraction, despite the slide show of evidence to the contrary. It’s trite to point out that nature is unforgiving, getting its revenge upon us now or else teaching us a lesson, perhaps in the nick of time, depending on what climate change scientists actually think and wonder. It’s further trite to distill the Bleger reverie and consider that what is always there is a warning to not ignore the signs of danger; to notice the impact of phenomena upon others, environments, even things. Indeed, it stirs shame to consider that Covid-19 has aroused more fear, more loss, or more determination than any other modern calamity simply because, unlike any other world event one might remember, this has truly impacted everyone to one degree or another. I conjure the grim-faced, somewhat unsympathetic gaze of those who have known and felt war, environmental catastrophe, unspeakable man-made atrocities or the constant slaps of racism and other oppressions. They may be quietly saying, Oh, so we’re all in this together now, are we? Maybe some of them got a head start. They’re like California, or North Korea or Singapore, or whomever else might have done this thing right. They were and are good with the things, and technology, that which mediates and distances us from nature, enables, intrudes, obstructs, complicates, and yet may save us. It helps…sort of.

 

 

 

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I’m thinking of something

 

The analytic situation may be studied from the point of view of the methodology it stands for: a framework comprised of technique, context, and the variables of temporal and material reality imposed upon a subject, and therefore the subjective experience. The current analytic situation, rendered “Telepresent” by the outbreak of Covid-19 and the resultant lockdown of motility, brings a range of affordances which disturb the project that is analysis, yielding a new situation, shorn of its familiar parameters of sight and sound, and creating others due to the illusions of both distance and proximity. Nearly forty years ago, during a meeting of the British psychoanalytic society congress, what some dismiss as an apocryphal instance occurred: Society member W.O. Wodcot emerged from his seat to alert his quarrelsome colleagues, “excuse me gentleman, we’ve just invaded the Falklands”. That few in the room had ever heard of the obscure archipelago southeast of Argentina was aptly reflective of a psychic and material reality, the not-happening-here phenomena, as Abstemios (1969) refers to it. Such experiences are echoed in our transitional analytic situation wherein features of telepresence enable a secondary, man-made wall of resistances, most of which privilege an absence that is circumambient to the present experience. “I could be swearing,” exclaims a consultant psychiatrist, referring to the possibility of muting herself within the telepresent framework. “I could be lip-reading” I counter from the viewpoint of resilient, human adaptability. Or, I imagine an aliveness-draining parallel to another famous exchange, this between two notable figures of political history. Lady Astor: “Winston, if I were your wife, I’d unfriend you on Facebook”. Churchill: “Madam, if you were my wife I’d unfriend myself”. This dystopic vision draws our attention to a fresh project: how to restore the “kicking and kissing” problem of psychoanalysis; that lurking danger that lies beneath the veneer of civilized meeting that spares our profession from an imputing of utter hypocrisy.

Building upon Freud (1912), the conditions of a framework that include an analyst’s “evenly hovering attention”, Ariel (1992) offers the permutation, “evenly hovering presence” to signal the totality of the analyst’s being in the analytic situation, both with material and dynamic implications. “What’s the ladder for?” asked a patient when encountering an early experiment in this manner of working. The querulous anxiety in this patient was partly assuaged, according to Ariel, by the observation that note-taking was obviated by the analyst position, due to the risk of falling. This finding highlights the dichotomy of absence and presence that seems intrinsic to theories of change, or as Abstemios (1971) observes in his follow-up work: “Yes, that happens, but then so does something else”. The vicissitudes of affect, and of subjective experience in its entirety, is thus impacted by the variables of an analytic situation which, despite the contrivances of technique, process, and setting, are subject to collective contingency. So convinced was Ariel by the impact of the analyst upon the patient within the analytic frame that her homonymic nom d’une analyse was itself subject to mutation at different stages of her career. It is understood that while she never entirely renounced the validity of her “ladder” technique during her middle period, subsequent incarnations of her treatment method have introduced Le Terre analyse to indicate the grounded position of the analyst in the presence of the subject. This quiet failing notwithstanding, the absence of an alternative frame of being, as Obstinach (1975) has described, has hitherto placed a stifling burden upon the evolution of modern psychoanalysis.

The way I have stated this problem suggests the institutionalization of our project, and yet that project continues with the paradoxes of equidistance and absence unabated. The possibilities of thought, untouched by orthodox opinion, and tangential to zeitgeist, or else subsumed within a cornucopia of literature, are obscured over temporal and subjective reality. The inchoate emergence of dissident voices upon the analytic situation signal new affordances in our extant frameworks while echoing the creative opinion of silenced innovators. “That silence is selective”, wrote Quixote (1984), with double-meaning, referring to a patient with selective mutism, but also to a generalized observation that experiences in the patient third, in which an othered space disallows the pressure of the concrete interpretation, is transformed into a collective happening, observable yet indeterminate, and thus subject to disappearance. Falsthink (1987), whose neuroscientific research into the continuity of genomes has been discredited, views this same transformation in the context of a happening now versus post-phenomenon experience wherein subjective experiences of crisis and grief intersect, and then split-off. The dividend of his observation is today present, telekinetically or not, for our close reading and inspection: that what continues is the function of the mind despite the impinging of the environmental third, the vicissitudes of engagement and dissociation. Indeed, this happening accentuates the connection that we and our patients seek. It is our answer, to be alone in the presence of the absence.

 

REFERENCES

 

Abstemios, J. (1969) The diary of Fogo Von Slack: a dissertation upon smells. Flack lit press, Fargo, ND.

Abstemios, J. (1971) The mother of Moby Dick and the death of whaling. Carnic books, Muncie, Indiana.

Ariel, F. (1992) “Assault upon the frame: the evenly hovered presence”. Eurasian regional journal of free associative discourse. Vol 12: pp.73-73(about two-thirds of a page)

Falsthink, J. (1987). Forget about the genome thing, how about this? Carnic books, Muncie, Indiana.

Freud, S. (1912) “Recommendations to Physicians Practicing Psychoanalysis”, The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, vol 12: 97-108.

Obstinach, O. (1975) “In response to the suppression of Ariel’s ladder technique: a step down” International Journal of Psychoanalytic Controversies not otherwise published. Vol 1, p. 3.

Quixote, Q. (1984) Selective Mutism: the patient who would not be heard…sometimes. Carnic books, Muncie, Indiana.

 

 

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The Dr. Strangelove talk

 

 

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The Ego & the Id

 

Not the original, but a variation on a theme

Jogging past an assembly of children one morning I overheard a lesson being directed at them. An energetic, fatherly man was giving a taut lesson in basic soccer skills to a host of playful novices, and prefacing their exercises with a more fundamental, context-traversing appeal: if you have any questions—any at all—don’t be afraid to ask. There are no dumb questions. Everyone got that? He asked, sounding a bit more forceful than necessary given the point of his statement. With numb expressions, the kids gazed up at him, nodding compliantly, with their parents (a few were flanking the group) looking down with prompting influence. Did they get it? I wondered. Did any of them dare ask?

Such encouragements or exhortations tend to presume the following of both adults and children: not so much the possibility of incomprehension, as this coach was implying, but rather the constancy of attention. Everyone got that? He asked, with seeming reference to comprehension. This after implying, despite a contrary intention, that anyone who did not understand was “dumb”. A reaction formation, this would be called. But what of the inattentive? What of those children whose minds will have wandered, onto whatever is more pleasurable, or less onerous. Less onerous than soccer? I ask incredulously, because I’m a fan. The ego says to listen; to listen intently, without interruption, distraction. Comply, and to pay attention is even more important than to understand, so to not listen is to commit the greater sin, and to be consigned to shameful silence, at best hoping the information is repeated, granting a second chance to hear. The ego adds that when the authority figure asks if you understand, you affirm him or her lest that also bring about a problem, despite what the authority promises. For what would it mean if just one of those children—each about four or five years old, I guessed—had raised a hand and with impish innocence said something like, “I don’t understand what we’re doing”.

My reverie. My memory, perhaps? My wish? Had I ever been so brave as to draw attention to my incomprehension, or my implied indifference to an endeavor everyone around me seemed so committed to? I scroll through the tapes: not much, I have to say. Oh, there are moments when I have, with confidence usually, asked something that challenged the premises of an exercise; made a statement or two that drove a fork in a process, compelling someone or everyone to halt momentum, deal with me, my opinions, plus the glitches that difference, indifference, or disagreement produces. Freud taught that the unconscious is ever pushing for expression. It wants what it wants, does what it does, and so it traverses repression barriers, leaking out our bungling, our dreams…our distractions, our pleasures. The symptom of distraction, at times aggregated into diagnoses like ADHD (typically aimed at children who don’t listen), constitute the return of the repressed, in disguise. “Sorry, I forgot” says the person who nodded compliantly when asked if he understood, but then behaved in a manner that betrayed a secret truth: his mind was elsewhere. The ego operates imperfectly. Like the Id, it operates unconsciously (not always), contrary to popular opinion, looking to postpone the seeking of pleasure (the sole purpose of the Id), collecting sense data through the body, but failing to plug all the gaps, blocking those ideas that stir in us. The Ego is responsible for the censorship of truth—that moment of compliance in which the secret of inattention is held close to the chest. But then, so, too, might the moment of disclosure by the “brave” person voicing incomprehension be an act of the ego. It speaks to reality. Repression, that signature defense which is meant to keep our pleasure-seeking drives at bay, exerts a pressure to keep the unconscious hidden. This results in a counter pressure towards the conscious, yielding anxiety. Repression proper, as it is called, manifests in the derivatives of neurosis: our displacing symptoms as well as our inhibitions. Our phobias and other compromises.

What is this compromise of play, and what is a game, anyway, if not one more human activity with rules?

 

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